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Article

Interpreting Initiatives
Michael D. Gilbert

†

INTRODUCTION
In 2011, in the shadow of an explosive referendum on col1
lective bargaining rights, voters in Ohio quietly confronted Is2
sue 3. Drafted by conservative groups and propelled to the bal3
lot by 546,000 signatures, the measure would amend the state
constitution to read: “[N]o law or rule shall compel . . . any person, employer, or health care provider to participate in a health
4
care system.” The measure sought to undermine the “individual mandate,” a provision of the federal Affordable Care Act
5
6
(ACA) requiring Americans to purchase health insurance. The
† Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. This paper
was written for a symposium entitled A More Perfect Union? Democracy in the
Age of Ballot Initiatives held at the University of Minnesota School of Law on
October 26, 2012. For helpful input I thank attendees of that symposium and
Ben Doherty, Ethan Leib, Caleb Nelson, Dan Ortiz, Richard Schragger, Glen
Staszewski, and Ferras Vinh. Copyright © 2013 by Michael D. Gilbert.
1. See Rachel Weiner, Issue 2 Falls, Ohio Collective Bargaining Law Repealed, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2011, 9:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-fix/post/issue-2-falls-ohio-collective-bargaining-law-repealed/2011/11/
08/gIQAyZ0U3M_blog.html.
2. See Catherine Candisky, Health-Care Mandate Liberty or Lawsuit
‘Orgy’? Issue 3 Debaters Differ, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 27, 2011, at 1A
(“With less than two weeks until Election Day, Issue 3 has gotten scant attention and neither side apparently has funding for television advertising.”).
3. Jim Provance, Obama Health Care Opponents File Petitions in Columbus, TOLEDO BLADE, July 6, 2011, http://www.toledoblade.com/State/2011/
07/06/Obama-healthcare-opponents-file-petitions-in-Columbus.html.
4. OHIO SEC. OF STATE, ISSUE 3: PROPOSED BALLOT INITIATIVE (2009),
available
at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/upload/ballotboard/2011/3
-language.pdf
5. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. 2011).
6. See Andy Kroll, The Ohio Tea Party’s Big “Obamacare” Fail, MOTHER
JONES (Nov. 3, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/11/
ohio-issue-3-obamacare-tea-party (“An early pamphlet created by the Ohio
Project, the grassroots group created to promote the amendment, focuses entirely on defusing ‘the new federal health care measure passed by Congress.”).
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proponents of Issue 3 extolled voters to “[p]rotect your health
care freedom . . . and keep government out of your personal
7
medical decisions.” Ohioans approved the measure by a wide
8
margin, with 66% voting in favor.
Issue 3 cannot achieve its intended purpose because the
Supremacy Clause stipulates that federal laws like the ACA
9
trump state law. By the time of the election, even supporters of
10
the measure conceded that. But at the state level it still has
teeth. In addition to forbidding compulsory participation in a
(state) health care system, Issue 3 forbade laws prohibiting
“the purchase or sale of health care,” defined the term “health
11
care system,” and added other provisions to the constitution.
That language begs many questions. Does Issue 3 render invalid the state’s ban on late term abortions? That ban, the argument goes, unlawfully prohibits “the purchase or sale of health
12
care.” Does Issue 3 affect state policies on workers compensation, child support, school immunizations, college coverage, and
13
disease tracking? All of those programs compel some actors to
purchase health care or otherwise participate in the health care
14
system. The list of questions goes on. As one critic put it, Issue
15
3 “will breed an orgy of lawsuits.”
Issue 3 is not unique, nor are the interpretive challenges it
raises. Voters in dozens of states routinely use initiatives, some
constitutional and some statutory, to address important issues
16
ranging from taxes to abortion and eminent domain. The task
7. OHIO SEC. OF STATE, VOTE YES ON ISSUE 3 (2011), available at http://
www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/upload/ballotboard/2011/3-argument-for.pdf.
8. Weiner, supra note 1.
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10. See Candisky, supra note 2 (“In the first public debate on Issue 3, both
sides agreed that the proposed constitutional amendment would not exempt
Ohioans from a requirement in the new federal health-care law that most
Americans buy health insurance . . . .”).
11. See OHIO SEC. OF STATE, supra note 4.
12. See Press Release, Innovation Ohio, IO Report: Why Conservatives
Should Oppose Issue 3 (Oct. 26, 2011), http://innovationohio.org/press/io-report
-why-conservatives-should-oppose-issue-3.
13. See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN ET AL., INNOVATION OHIO, BAD MEDICINE:
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF OHIO’S ISSUE 3, at 3–4 (Sept. 1, 2011), http://
69.195.124.74/~innovby5/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/IOReport_
BadMedicine_0901.pdf; see also Kroll, supra note 6 (discussing potential unintended consequences).
14. See MEHLMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 3.
15. See Candisky, supra note 2.
16. These examples come from 2011 alone. See Election 2011 Preview,
BALLOTWATCH (Initiative & Referendum Inst., L.A., Cal.), Oct. 2011, http://
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17

of interpreting them routinely falls on courts. That interpretive function is especially fraught in the context of direct democracy. Many initiatives are poorly drafted, and many judges
are subject to reelection by the same voters who approved the
initiatives.
This Article takes on the twin questions of how do, and
how should, courts interpret initiatives? With respect to the
first, judges almost universally claim that they seek “voter in18
tent.” Scholars reject this approach on the ground that such
19
intent does not exist or cannot be ascertained. In other words,
judges are not doing—indeed, cannot do—what they say. But I
suggest otherwise. We can understand the search for voter intent to be a search for the preferences of the median voter. That
concept is concrete. Those preferences, though difficult to ascer20
tain, did exist when the initiative passed. This analysis clarifies the inquiry by uncovering an objective target for judges in
these cases. It also may have explanatory power. Judges subject to reelection or reappointment have some incentive to consider the interpretation today’s median voter would favor, and
today’s median may resemble the enacting median.
With respect to the second question, I develop the case for
why judges should interpret initiatives consistent with the
preferences of the median voter. Direct democracy is an explic21
itly majoritarian institution. In 1912, Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed that the power of initiative and referendum would help
ensure “the majority of the people do in fact, as well as theory,
22
rule.” It makes sense then, one might reason, to identify the
plausible interpretations of an initiative and ask which one a
majority of voters would have preferred. Under reasonable assumptions, a majority would have preferred the median voter’s
23
favorite interpretation to all others. That interpretation has
an especially strong claim to being majoritarian and, therefore,
is consistent with the purpose of direct democracy.

www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202011-1%20Preview.pdf.
17. See infra Part I (discussing how judges do and should interpret initiatives).
18. See infra Part I.A.
19. See infra Part I.
20. They existed under certain assumptions anyway. See infra Part II.
21. See infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
22. 17 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, The Right of the People to Rule, in THE
WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 151, 152 (Hermann Hagedorn ed., 1926).
23. See infra Part II.
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I am not the first to suggest that judges focus on the median. Many scholars have argued that courts interpreting statutes do—or should—consider the preferences of the median leg24
islator or of median committee members. But the argument is
much stronger where initiatives are concerned. Focusing on the
median does not further the purpose of legislatures, but it does
further the purpose of direct democracy.
To be clear, I do not argue that majoritarianism is “best” or
socially optimal. Nor do I endorse direct democracy. I do not
even “endorse” majoritarian interpretations. I am not advocating for a policy proposal but rather exploring ideas. I am trying
to separate questions about the meaning of particular initiatives from normative judgments about the use of initiatives in
general. If we focus just on meaning, and if we accept direct
democracy’s majoritarian purpose, then we can develop a case
for attending to the preferences of the median voter.
The analysis leads to some surprising conclusions. If judges
confront an ambiguity in an initiative, and if they seek the majoritarian interpretation, then they should consider the views of
25
all voters, including those who opposed the initiative. Courts
probably should not adopt the interpretation favored by an initiative’s drafters, even though they know the initiative best.
Opinion polls might be helpful when interpreting initiatives.
Lastly, we should not necessarily condemn judges for interpreting initiatives in a particular way because of electoral concerns.
To the extent that they respond to today’s median voter, and to
the extent that today’s median resembles the enacting median,
such judges can be understood to act legalistically.
The paper concludes by connecting the question of interpretation to the question of constitutional review. Some prominent scholars fear that initiatives violate federal and state constitutions more often than ordinary legislation. Unchecked
majorities, they worry, will stamp on the rights of minorities.
They have responded by calling for a more searching judicial
review of initiatives. Facilitating that kind of review probably
would require greater judicial independence; judges subject to
reelection or reappointment probably will not strike down popular initiatives on the constitutional margin. But greater independence implies less accountability, which in turn implies a
24. See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992) (arguing for the use
of positive political theory to interpret original legislative intent).
25. See infra notes 137–41 and accompanying text.

2013]

INTERPRETING INITIATIVES

1625

weaker incentive to respond to the median voter when interpreting ambiguities. So scholars may face a choice. To get the
searching judicial review that initiatives may warrant they
may have to sacrifice the majoritarian interpretations that initiatives deserve.
One clarification is in order. In this paper I focus only on
judicial interpretation of initiatives, by which I mean plebiscites drafted by private individuals or groups and presented to
the electorate for a vote. I include in that category indirect initiatives that were first presented to the legislature and then,
after the legislature failed to approve them, presented to the
electorate. I focus on both constitutional and statutory initiatives. I do not analyze referendums, by which I mean plebiscites involving laws that originated in the legislature.
I. THE INTERPRETATION DILEMMA
For over a century Americans have used initiatives to
26
make law at state and local levels, but the attendant questions about interpretation long escaped scholars’ notice. Profes27
sor Jane S. Schacter wrote the germinal article in 1995. Her
paper, like mine and most of the literature on the topic, divides
the inquiry into two parts, one descriptive and one normative.
A. HOW DO JUDGES INTERPRET INITIATIVES?
Schacter began with the descriptive question, how do judges interpret initiatives? She examined fifty-three cases in which
28
judges interpreted statewide statutory initiatives. She found
that in the “vast majority” of those cases, “courts declare[d]
that their task is to locate the controlling popular intent behind
29
the provision at issue.” Subsequent studies have generally
30
supported her conclusion. When faced with ambiguity in an
initiative, courts ask what voters intended.
26. See KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 22–40
(2009) (describing the Populist inception of direct democracy and its development through the Progressive Era into the late twentieth century).
27. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent:” Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995).
28. See id. at 114–17 (describing the criteria and geographic composition
of the cases).
29. Id. at 117.
30. See, e.g., Sean Pager, Is Busing Preferential? An Interpretive Analysis
of Proposition 209, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 12 (1999) (“When construing a constitutional provision enacted by initiative, the intent of the voters is the paramount consideration.” (quoting Davis v. City of Berkeley, 794 P.2d 897, 900
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What sources do courts use to ascertain voter intent?
Schacter found that they rely heavily on the text of the initia31
tive in question. That is consistent with the common and sensible (but not irrefutable) claim that the language of a law pro32
vides the best evidence of the lawmakers’ intentions. They
also consider other legal texts, such as related statutes and of33
ficial ballot materials. Those materials, which are prepared by
the government and made available to voters before the election, typically contain the titles of the initiatives to be voted on,
short summaries of them, their full texts, arguments by propo34
nents and opponents, and so forth.
Interestingly, courts do not often rely on media. They do
not consider news reports regarding the initiatives, editorials,
political advertisements supporting or opposing them, en35
dorsements, or opinion polls. Schacter found that paradoxi36
cal. Most voters rely heavily on media—and little on legal
37
text—when forming their intentions and deciding how to vote.
Yet courts seeking voters’ intentions focus on text.
(Cal. 1990))); Glenn C. Smith, Solving the “Initiatory Construction” Puzzle
(and Improving Direct Democracy) by Appropriate Refocusing on Sponsor Intent, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 261 (2007) (“[Courts] seek to discern the intent
of the ‘legislators’ (citizen voters) who enacted the law in question. . . . [I]nitiatory-construction commentators have discussed cases that confirm the point. Searching for voter intent . . . continues to be a staple of opinion writing in California.”). But see Michael M. O’Hear, Statutory
Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons from the Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 283 (2003) (reviewing cases interpreting drug
treatment initiatives and concluding that Schacter “may have overemphasized
the role of popular intent”).
31. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 120–23 (noting an “almost exclusive
focus” on “formal sources”).
32. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 357–
69 (2005) (detailing the debate between textualists and intentionalists as to
the appropriate sources for discerning legislative intent).
33. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 120–23.
34. See id.
35. See id. (“With a single exception, the opinions studied never mentioned information provided to voters by the news media or by advertisements.”).
36. See id. at 130–44 (noting this paradox “draws sharply into question
the decipherability of mass electoral intentions”).
37. Id. (providing evidence); see Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct
Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus”, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1145–46, 1151–54, 1157–59 (2003) (explaining how and why voters in direct democracy use heuristic cues); see also Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 296–99 (2005)
(same); Press Release, Wash. Sec’y of State, Reed Asks Lawmakers to Trim
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In summary, courts interpreting initiatives behave much
38
like courts interpreting ordinary legislation. In both settings,
judges often state that they seek the intent of the lawmakers,
whether legislators or voters. They then try to identify that intent by examining the text of the law and its legislative history—committee reports and related sources for ordinary legisla39
tion, official ballot materials for initiatives.
Courts in both settings are subject to the same twopronged criticism: group intent does not exist or cannot be ascertained. Various scholars have made the point in various
40
ways, but perhaps Max Radin, writing in 1930, stated it best:
A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with
words which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable
number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different
ideas and beliefs.
. . . The chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind . . . are infinitesimally
small. . . . Even if the contents of the minds of the legislature were
41
uniform, we have no means of knowing that content . . . .

Initiatives magnify the problems Radin identified. Voters far
outnumber legislators, they have a weaker grasp on technical
legal terms, and they are less likely to foresee the myriad situa42
tions to which a new law may apply. That means they will
have mixed intent, nonsensical intent, or no intent at all on
Elections Costs (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://www.sos.wa.gov/office/news_
releases.aspx (describing a recent effort by Washington’s Secretary of State to
remove the text of initiatives from a distributed ballot pamphlet on the ground
that “few people bother to read the entire text of a ballot measure”).
38. See Jack L. Landau, Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative: An
Assessment of Proposals to Apply Specialized Interpretive Rules, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 487, 497 (1998) (discussing the processes judges follow in
interpreting initiatives and stating, “[t]he result is an interpretive methodology that identifies the same goal and proceeds in essentially the same manner
as that used in interpreting legislatively enacted statutes”).
39. Id. at 497–99.
40. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 16 (1997)
(noting the search for legislative intent “does not square with some of the (few)
generally accepted concrete rules of statutory construction”); Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
41. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870
(1930).
42. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 126–30 (discussing these problems);
see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 921 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“[I]nquiries into legislative intent are even more difficult than
usual when the legislative body whose unified intent must be determined consists of 825,162 Arkansas voters.”).
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many questions. Even if voters do have an intent, judges cannot possibly uncover it.
California provides a helpful example. In 1982, voters
there approved an initiative that established a statutory defini43
tion of insanity. Under the new law, sustaining an insanity
defense required one to show that “he or she was incapable of
knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her
44
act and of distinguishing right from wrong.” The conjunctive
“and” made it harder to sustain an insanity defense—harder
45
than it had been under the test in People v. Drew, which the
initiative supplanted, and harder than it had been under the
46
47
test in M’Naghten’s Case, which prevailed before Drew. In
48
People v. Skinner, the Supreme Court of California interpreted the initiative. The court concluded that the initiative “was
49
intended to . . . restore the M’Naghten test.” Reaching that re50
sult required the court to correct a “draftsman’s error,” replacing “and” with “or.” The notion that most voters understood—
and understood in the same way—the tests in M’Naghten and
Drew, the relationship between those tests and the language
quoted above, and the possibility that courts would correct the
51
“error” in the initiative is “strikingly implausible.”
For reasons like that Schacter calls the search for voter in52
tent “[i]ntractable” and “futile.” Professor Glenn Smith calls
53
voter intent an “illusory commodity.” Professor Chris Goodman has written, “[i]t is truly a legal fiction to attempt to ascertain a common intent from the millions of people who vote in
54
favor of a particular ballot measure.” Even if such an intent
43. See People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 753 (Cal. 1985).
44. Id.
45. 583 P.2d 1318, 1329 (Cal. 1978), superseded by statute, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 25 (West 1999), as recognized in Skinner, 704 P.2d at 754.
46. (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719.
47. See Skinner, 704 P.2d at 754.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 758.
51. Schacter, supra note 27, at 141.
52. Id. at 123, 153.
53. Smith, supra note 30, at 263–64.
54. Chris Chambers Goodman, Examining “Voter Intent” Behind Proposition 209: Why Recruitment, Retention, and Scholarship Privileges Should Be
Permissible Under Article I, Section 31, 27 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 59, 72
(2008). Of course, there are arguments to the contrary. See, e.g., Cathy R.
Silak, The People Act, the Courts React: A Proposed Model for Interpreting Initiatives in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) (supporting the search for voter
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existed, courts could not find it. As Professor Philip Frickey explained, “the only practical way to attempt to investigate [voters’] motive would be to invade the sanctity of the secret ballot.”
55
Even then “one might well end up with equivocal . . . data.”
All of that criticism begs an important question. If judges
cannot ascertain voter intent, what should they do instead?
B. HOW SHOULD JUDGES INTERPRET INITIATIVES?
Scholars have called for new approaches to the interpretation of initiatives. Schacter, for example, would like courts to
56
use an interpretive regime specially designed for them. The
regime would include “interpretive litigation,” which would allow litigants, intervenors, and amici curiae to “explore in depth
57
and argue the merits of different plausible interpretations.”
58
She would also like courts to watch for “abuse” of the process.
Initiatives that are long, complex, full of jargon, characterized
by “subliminally directed advertising,” or harmful to marginal59
ized groups should, in her view, be interpreted narrowly.
Frickey also proposed reforms. He called for a “three-part
60
canonical inquiry to interpreting ballot propositions.” First,
courts should work especially hard to avoid interpretations of
61
initiatives that cast doubt on their constitutionality. Second,
because direct democracy is “in derogation of republican government,” initiatives should be narrowly construed when they
62
conflict with pre-existing laws. And third, substantive canons
such as the rule of lenity should be given extra force where ini63
tiatives are concerned.
Other proposals abound. Professor Glen Staszewski argues
that under certain circumstances courts should resolve ambiguities in initiatives consistent with the intent of their sponsors,
64
not voters. Some favor a “purposive or dynamic approach” to
intent and proposing guidelines on how to discern it).
55. Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 488–89 n.67.
56. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 152–64.
57. Id. at 155.
58. Id. at 157.
59. Id. at 156–59.
60. Frickey, supra note 55, at 522.
61. Id. at 512–17, 522.
62. Id. at 517–22.
63. See id. at 522–23.
64. See Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and
Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 433–35
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65

interpreting initiatives. Others argue that in order to encourage clear drafting, initiatives should be interpreted to the det66
riment of their drafters. Still others argue for broad interpretations when initiatives address certain issues, such as
redistricting, term limits, the advancement of marginalized
67
groups, and narrow interpretations in other circumstances.
One paper argues that courts should look for the intent of “that
voter who falls as far to the narrow side of center as the text al68
lows.”
I do not purport in the preceding paragraphs to capture all
details of the proposed reforms. Nor will I work systematically
69
through their pros, which may be substantial, and their cons.
Instead I will highlight what I believe to be a commonality of
every proposal: they do not further direct democracy’s purpose.
Direct democracy is a fundamentally majoritarian institution. Defending direct democracy in a speech, Theodore Roosevelt thundered that “[n]o sane man who has been familiar with
the government of this country for the last twenty years will
complain that we have had too much of the rule of the majori70
ty.” In 1893, J.W. Sullivan argued that direct democracy
would facilitate governance in accordance with “the conscience

(2003); see also Smith, supra note 30 (refining and expanding Staszewski’s
proposal); cf. Ethan J. Leib, Interpreting Statutes Passed Through Referendums, 7 ELECTION L.J. 49, 49–51 (2008) (arguing that referenda, which “enable[] citizens to ratify or reject statutes passed by a legislature,” should be interpreted consistent with legislative intent).
65. Evan C. Johnson, Comment, People v. Floyd: An Argument Against
Intentionalist Interpretation of Voter Initiatives, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 981,
983 (2005).
66. See generally D. Zachary Hudson, Comment, Interpreting the Products
of Direct Democracy, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 223, 224 (2009).
67. See Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2748, 2766–68 (2005); see also Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 35 (1997) (suggesting that courts distinguish between “structural” and “legislative” initiatives and treat them differently).
68. Stephen Salvucci, Note, Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say:
The Interpretation of Initiatives in California, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 871, 884
(1998).
69. For criticism of proposed reforms, especially those of Schacter,
Frickey, or both, see generally Landau, supra note 38, at 490; John Copeland
Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 535, 536; O’Hear, supra note 30, at 336; Smith, supra note 30, at 28; Note,
Judicial Approach to Direct Democracy, supra note 67, at 2762. See also
Frickey, supra note 55, at 492–94 (critiquing Schacter’s proposals).
70. ROOSEVELT, supra note 22, at 152.
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71

of the majority.” His book helped place direct democracy on
72
the national agenda. William Jennings Bryan, a leading advocate of direct democracy, argued that the initiative “is the most
effective means . . . for giving the people absolute control over
73
their Government.” For him “the people” meant “the majori74
ty.” The Populists who agitated for direct democracy believed
a “majority of the people . . . could never be corruptly influ75
enced.”
I see no reason to believe that Schacter’s interpretive litigation, or that Schacter and Frickey’s narrow constructions,
will vindicate the will of the majority. Nor were they intended
76
to. I see no reason to believe that giving extra force to substantive canons of construction will either. Sponsor intent may
not align with majority will, and interpreting initiatives to the
detriment of sponsors may undercut majority will. In short,
none of the proposed reforms, laudable though they may be in
many regards, comports systematically with the core purpose of
initiatives, which is to effectuate the will of the majority.
Why might that be? The explanation, I believe, lies in a
conflation. Scholars have mixed questions about the meaning of
particular initiatives with normative judgments about the initiative process. Instead of determining the meaning of initiatives first and then making normative judgments about them,
71. J.W. SULLIVAN, DIRECT LEGISLATION BY THE
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 7 (1892).

CITIZENSHIP THROUGH

72. See RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROAMERICA 28 (2002) (“Arguably the single most important event in the
birth of the initiative and referendum in America was the publication . . . of a
small book with the awkward title Direct Legislation by the Citizenship
through the Initiative and Referendum. So electric was its impact that the title
page of the 1893 edition boasted that it was ‘the book that started the Referendum Movement.’”).
73. WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN, THE PEOPLE’S LAW 10 (1914).
74. See id. at 16–19 (discussing how simple majorities of voters decide
whether initiatives take effect); see also MILLER, supra note 26, at 26 (“Bryan
. . . believed that [the initiative power] should be made as robust as possible so
that the majority could have its way.”).
75. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 45 (1989).
76. Schacter described her approach as “metademocratic.” Schacter, supra
note 27, at 153. It would “further a larger vision of democracy,” id., by, for example, “infusing the initiative lawmaking process with norms favoring deliberation and discouraging abuses of the process.” Id. at 161. Frickey argued
that interpretation in this area should attempt to achieve two goals: “respect
for direct democracy” and “respect for public values—especially constitutional
values, including the republican value of representative government.” Frickey,
supra note 55, at 510.
CESS IN
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they start with normative judgments that drive the determination of meaning. Schacter, for example, worries about information deficits on the part of voters, the lack of deliberation,
and the ability of organized interest groups to abuse the initia77
tive process. Frickey was concerned with the lack of “robust”
public consideration of initiatives and with strategic drafting
78
and manipulation by sponsors. Those general concerns influenced those scholars’ (and perhaps others’) views towards interpretation.
That approach can create at least two problems. First, the
resulting prescriptions may be wrong. The initiative process is
not always flawed or flawed in the same way. General interpretative techniques designed to mitigate a flaw, or a set of flaws,
79
may be inapt for any particular initiative. If they are sufficiently inapt sufficiently often, their costs will exceed their
benefits. Second, even if the techniques mitigate problems, they
come at a price: difficulty in assessing the process. Observers
may not know whether to attribute the successes and failures
of initiatives to the process itself—direct voting by the people—
or to judges’ efforts to smooth the edges of the process with specialized interpretations. That could cloud the pros and cons of
initiatives and stifle reforms.
The rest of the paper separates the two lines of analysis.
Rather than considering ambiguities in initiatives with an eye
towards general problems with the process, I consider them
with an eye towards the purpose of the process. That purpose is
to further majority will. And that raises a question: Can we ascertain the will of the majority and use it to resolve ambiguities
in initiatives? Or is majority will, like voter intent, a rhetorically attractive but empty concept?
II. MEDIAN DEMOCRACY AND MAJORITY WILL
This Part relates the notion of majority will to a technical
concept, the “Condorcet winner.” I define that concept and explain why the Condorcet winner among a set of policy proposals
has an especially strong claim to being the majoritarian social
77. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 155–59. Many observers have expressed such concerns. See, e.g., Staszewski, supra note 64, at 412–35.
78. See Frickey, supra note 55, at 523 (arguing that his interpretive approach could help resolve those problems).
79. Schacter recognized this. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 160 (noting,
for example, that a “universal rule of narrow construction applied to all initiative laws . . . would be flawed in important respects”).
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choice. I also explain why Condorcet winners do not usually exist when legislators vote on legislation but plausibly do exist
when voters vote on initiatives. In the initiative setting, the
Condorcet winner will tend to be the proposal favored by the
median voter. Readers already familiar with these ideas can
skip to Part III.
In The Strategic Constitution, Professor Robert Cooter distinguishes between two systems for making collective decisions
80
in a democracy. The first system, which he calls bargain democracy, is characterized by representatives of the citizenry
81
compromising with one another across policy issues. When
members of Congress engage in logrolling to pass a bill—you
support my farm subsidies, I will support your environmental
protections—they epitomize bargain democracy.
Bargain democracy has many potential advantages, including the ability to capture gains from trade. Just as a buyer and
seller of goods both gain from a voluntary transaction—they
must, otherwise they would not have engaged in it—buyers and
82
sellers of votes gain too. The Congressman who supports farm
subsidies and the Congresswoman who supports environmental
protections exchange votes with one another to enact their favorite policies. That makes them better off and, if they accurately represent their constituents, it can make society better
83
off too.
But bargain democracy has downsides, one of which is that
it problematizes the concept of majority will. That is because
bargain democracy usually fails to select from the menu of poli-

80. See generally ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 101–
70, 361–63 (2000) [hereinafter COOTER, STRATEGIC] (distinguishing median
democracy, which involves issue-by-issue decision-making, from bargain democracy, which involves decision-making across issues); Robert Cooter, Constitutional Consequentialism: Bargain Democracy Versus Median Democracy, 3
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 7 (2002).
81. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 361–63.
82. For the germinal analysis, see generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1965); see also Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 831–36 (2006)
(discussing potential consequences of logrolling).
83. Gilbert, supra note 82, at 836 (stating that “[i]f legislators accurately
represent all of their constituents, then . . . legislators and citizens will generally experience the same effects from vote trading,” but noting that this is unrealistic because preferences vary and some constituents “will benefit from a
particular vote trade while others will suffer harm”).
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cy options the Condorcet winner—indeed, it usually precludes
the existence of a Condorcet winner.
The Condorcet winner is the proposal that would defeat all
other proposals in a head-to-head vote under a system of major84
ity rule. To illustrate, if legislators consider three alternative
policy proposals, X, Y, and Z, and if a majority prefers X to Y
and X to Z, then X is the Condorcet winner. A majority prefers
X to all alternatives.
The Condorcet winner has normative appeal. As Professor
William Riker wrote,
According to the first, “deeper” requirement of fairness and consistency, the Condorcet criterion, if an alternative beats (or ties) all others
in pairwise contests, then it ought to win. This notion is closely related to the notion of equality and “one man, one vote,” in the sense that,
when an alternative opposed by a majority wins, quite clearly the
votes of some people are not being counted the same as other people’s
85
votes.

Riker’s second sentence is most important for my purposes. The
Condorcet winner can be said to capture, in a concrete way, majority will. It is the only alternative that a majority prefers to
all others. If a decision-making process fails to select the Condorcet winner, then majority will has not been actualized, because a majority would prefer the Condorcet winner.
To be clear, I am not arguing that the Condorcet winner is
the best collective choice, only that it has special claim to being
the majoritarian choice. Many scholars have argued along
86
those lines.
Under bargain democracy, there usually is no Condorcet
winner. That is because bargain democracy involves multiple
issues—you vote for my issue, I vote for yours—and in the
84. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 41.
85. WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 100 (1982).
86. See, e.g., GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON 329 (2011)
(“Condorcet voting is often considered the most majoritarian way to choose
among three or more alternatives.”); Gerald H. Kramer, Some Procedural Aspects of Majority Rule, in NOMOS XVIII: DUE PROCESS 264, 268 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977) (“When an alternative satisfies the
Condorcet criterion, we can speak of the majority will . . . .”); cf. DUNCAN
BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 57–58 (1958) (“[T]he
majority candidate who, in a direct vote against them, would defeat each of the
others . . . . ought to be elected . . . . [T]he claims of the Condorcet criterion to
rightness seem to us much stronger than those of any other.”); Saul Levmore,
Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA.
L. REV. 971, 994–95 (1989) (“[I]t is reasonable to proceed, as does virtually the
entire collective choice literature, under the assumption that a Condorcet winner is very desirable.”).
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presence of multiple issues collective preferences are usually
87
“intransitive,” which means they are circular. Social choice
88
theorists have offered general analyses of the problem. Here I
illustrate with an example.
Suppose three legislators are deciding whether to vote for
89
three individual policy proposals, X, Y, and Z. Suppose the
policy proposals address unrelated matters. The first legislator
supports X and X alone, the second supports Y and Y alone, and
the third support Z and Z alone. Each feels so strongly about
her favored policy that she would gladly accept either one of the
disfavored policies to get it. So three packages of proposals—
XY, XZ, YZ—would defeat the status quo in a head-to-head
vote. Among the packages, however, there may be no Condorcet
winner. One majority (legislators 1 and 2) might prefer XY to
XZ, while another majority (legislators 1 and 3) prefers XZ to
YZ, and a third majority (legislators 2 and 3) prefers YZ to XY.
Their collective preferences run in circles, and consequently
there is no Condorcet winner.
Readers unfamiliar with social choice theory might wonder
if this circularity problem is common or the product of my stylized example. The answer is the former. As you increase the
number of voters and issues to better approximate the real
90
world, intransitivity becomes almost certain.
Intransitivity does not condemn bargain democracy, and
nor does it often occur. Structural mechanisms like agenda setting and stable bargaining among politicians can prevent legislatures from spinning their wheels, even if the underlying pref91
erences of legislators are circular. But intransitivity does
87. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 37–40.
88. For an accessible discussion with cites to the original work, see
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 49–102 (1997).
89. For a fuller discussion, see Gilbert, supra note 82, at 833–36.
90. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 42 (“Voter preferences often
form intransitive cycles when political choices occur in multiple dimensions.”);
RIKER, supra note 85, at 121 (“[A]s the number of voters and alternatives increases, so do the number of profiles without a Condorcet winner.”); SHEPSLE
& BONCHEK, supra note 88, at 101 (“In multidimensional spatial settings, except in the case of a rare distribution of ideal points (like radial symmetry)
that hardly ever occurs naturally . . . . [T]here will be chaos—no Condorcet
winner, anything can happen . . . .”). These conclusions follow from important
papers, including Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional
Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY
472 (1976).
91. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 43–46. These conclusions
follow from important papers, including Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Ar-
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mean that in the context of bargain democracy we can only talk
92
of majority will in a limited way. Anytime legislation passes,
we can say that a majority prefers that legislation to the status
quo. But we cannot say that a majority prefers that legislation
to all alternatives.
Now consider Cooter’s second system for making collective
decisions in a democracy, median democracy. This system is
characterized by representatives of the citizenry, or even citi93
zens themselves, making decisions issue-by-issue. If members
of Congress voted on a particular farm subsidy only, with no
thoughts of past or future votes on other issues, and then did
the same for a particular provision about the environment, that
would epitomize median democracy.
Under median democracy, voters cannot capture gains
from trade. Median democracy requires them, whether they are
legislators or lay citizens, to decide each issue individually,
with no opportunity to make concessions on one in exchange for
94
favors on another. But median democracy has an important
upside: it can select a Condorcet winner, and under certain assumptions it will.
Consider this example. Three voters are choosing from
three tax rates. The conservative voter prefers 5%, the liberal
voter prefers 15%, and the moderate voter prefers 10%. As taxes go above or below a voter’s ideal rate, that voter becomes less
and less happy. The moderate is the median voter—one voter
prefers a higher rate than she, and one prefers a lower rate.
Her preferred rate, 10%, defeats each alternative rate 2-to-1 in
95
a head-to-head vote. The median voter’s ideal point is the
Condorcet winner.

rangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 23, 31–33 (1979).
92. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 42 (“Political philosophy
typically justifies laws enacted in a democracy on the grounds that they represent the ‘will of the majority’ or the ‘intent of the people’s representatives.’
Given intransitive voting, however, these phrases make no sense. Intransitive
voters have no collective ‘will’ because they contradict themselves.”).
93. See id. at 25–35, 361–63.
94. This can lead to problems. Voters must make decisions about a single
issue even when they have non-separable preferences across issues, that is,
even when their optimal decision on that one issue depends on what happens
with other issues. For a discussion, see Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, A
Problem with Referendums, 12 J. THEORETICAL POL. 5, 6–8, 10–16 (2000).
95. The conservative and the moderate prefer 10% to 15%, the moderate
and liberal prefer 10% to 5%.
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The example can be generalized. When voters cast votes on
a single policy issue (in the example, tax rates), and when voters have single-peaked preferences (the further policy moves
from their preferred point, whether it is 5% or 10% or whatever, the less happy they become), then the median voter’s ideal
96
point is always the Condorcet winner. A series of pairwise
votes among the options—5% versus 10%, 10% versus 15%, and
so forth—will lead inevitably to the selection of the policy that
the median voter most prefers. Once selected, that policy cannot be defeated by an alternative. That result, well-known in
97
political science, is the median voter theorem.
The theorem explains why Cooter calls his second decision98
making system median democracy. Under that system, and
when the conditions in the prior paragraph hold, policy on each
issue will gravitate towards the median voter’s ideal point.
The theorem leads to this important point. In the context of
median democracy, we can talk about majority will in a rich
fashion. After a complete series of votes, we cannot only say
that a majority prefers the policy left standing to the status
99
quo. We can say a majority prefers it to all alternative policies.
When in the United States do we make collective decisions
under a system of median democracy? When we vote on initia100
tives, or so one can reasonably argue. On many issues voters
plausibly have single-peaked preferences, and many initiatives
are limited to a single issue. That may be because initiatives
are more likely to pass when so limited. Adding extra issues
can increase opposition, the argument goes, so initiative spon101
sors have an incentive to limit them to one. In addition, most
96. There is an additional requirement: there is a unique median. See PE162 (1986).
97. The theorem was developed in BLACK, supra note 86, at 56–57. For an
accessible discussion, see COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 25–27.
98. See, COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 361.
99. I am still assuming that the conditions specified above are satisfied.
100. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 145 (“In general, direct democracy factors [i.e., separates] the issues, so the median voter should prevail.” (emphasis removed)).
101. See Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, CryptoInitiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 961
(2005) (“The addition of a second, third, or fourth dimension [to a ballot initiative] is political suicide because it increases the possibility of generating opposition.”). Of course, adding issues can also increase support. See Gilbert, supra
note 82, at 831–36 (discussing logrolling in legislatures, the practice of combining provisions, each supported by a minority, into one bill supported by a
majority).
TER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY
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states have a “single subject rule” which is designed to limit in102
itiatives to a single issue. Evidence suggests that the rule
103
does, in fact, limit the scope of some initiatives.
To summarize, bargain and median democracy are alternative systems for making decisions in a democracy. Each has
pros and cons, and each has implications for majority will. Under bargain democracy, we have only a thin conception of majority will. We can state that a majority prefers every proposal
that passes to the status quo, but we cannot state that a majority prefers a particular proposal to all others. Under median
democracy, we have a thicker conception of majority will. There
is a Condorcet winner, at least some of the time and maybe
much of the time. The majority prefers that policy to all alternatives. To effectuate that policy, many argue, is to effectuate
majority will. Voting on initiatives often epitomizes median
democracy.
To be clear, the initiative process may not epitomize ideal
median democracy. Eligible voters outnumber registered voters, and registered voters outnumber actual voters. Consequently, those who vote on initiatives may be unrepresentative
104
of society. Those who vote may lack full information about in105
itiatives, they may be fooled or manipulated by initiative
106
sponsors or opponents, and they may vote inconsistently with
107
their own preferences. Voters may approve initiatives that
102. See Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 704–12 (2010).
103. See Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence From
Single Subject Adjudication, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 345–46 (2011) (finding
fewer subjects in ballot propositions that judges do not strike down on single
subject grounds than in propositions they do, suggesting that the rule deters
multidimensional propositions).
104. See, e.g., DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 100–21 (1984) (providing evidence that
only a non-representative subset of voters vote on initiatives).
105. See, e.g., id. at 127–44 (showing that initiatives and ballot pamphlets
are difficult to read and that high percentages of voters report being confused
by some initiatives); see also Craig M. Burnett et al., The Dilemma of Direct
Democracy, 9 ELECTION L.J. 305, 307, 312–17 (2010) (providing evidence that
significant numbers of voters knew nothing about the initiatives in the study
and that some voters made “erratic” choices when voting).
106. See, e.g., SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES:
OPINION, VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 18 (1998) (describing how interest
groups sometimes place propositions on the ballot that conflict with others on
the ballot in order to “confuse voters” and make the ballot “so long that voters
out of frustration and fatigue vote No on all measures”).
107. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 104, at 144 (reporting a survey showing three-quarters of voters on a rent control proposition in California failed to
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are attractive as standalone policies but problematic when cou108
pled with other policies.
Those concerns are important in general but largely irrelevant for this paper. Recall that I am separating questions of interpretation from normative judgments about the initiative
process, including judgments premised on the above concerns.
Doing so leads to new insights about interpretation, which is
my focus. As it turns out, however, those insights point to at
least one new method for addressing some of the above concerns, as I explain in Part IV.
III. VOTER INTENT REVISITED
With ideas from Part II in hand, I return to the question of
interpreting initiatives. Recall that judges confronting ambiguities in initiatives seek, or claim to seek, to resolve them in accordance with voter intent. Scholars dismiss that. They argue
that voters typically have different intents, or no intent at all,
with respect to the often obscure and complicated questions
that arise in litigation. That is clearly correct, but it may miss
the point.
We need not understand judges to seek, literally, the intent
of voters. Instead, we can understand them to be searching for
the Condorcet winner. In other words, we can understand them
to be asking this question: among plausible interpretations,
which one would the voters who voted on the initiative have
109
preferred to all others?
match their policy views on that subject with their votes); David Fleischer,
Prop. 8 by the Numbers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A15 (“Polling suggests
that half a million people who opposed same-sex marriage mistakenly voted
against the proposition. They were confused by the idea that a “no” vote was
actually a vote for gay marriage.”).
108. See Lacy & Niou, supra note 94, at 12–13 (describing how separate
votes on initiatives can lead to passage of a combination of initiatives that voters unanimously oppose). For an interesting, plausible example of the problems Lacy and Niou identify, see BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 106, at
118–19 (describing how, in 1908, Oregon voters simultaneously approved two
ballot measures, one restricting fishing upstream on the Columbia River and
the other restricting fishing downstream, and together closing much of the
river to fishing despite the importance of fishing to the economy).
109. This is a version of imaginative reconstruction, where “the interpreter
tries to discover ‘what the law-maker meant by assuming his position.’”
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 226 (2d ed. 2006) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7
COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907)). Imaginative reconstruction does not necessarily have a clear objective. See id. at 227 (“It is not clear that imaginative
reconstruction can avoid the . . . problems of specific intent theory . . . . Whose
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To begin, my claim is positive and interpretive. I tentatively hypothesize that judges are already doing this, or at least
that we can sensibly understand them to be trying to do this.
They may not ask themselves the actual question posed in the
prior paragraph, but they pursue other inquiries and use interpretive tools that tend to yield the same answer that they
would have given had they asked the question. I have no hard
evidence that this is true, but a few observations support it.
Consider first judges’ language. When judges say they seek
110
111
“voter intent” or the “intent of the electorate,” they might
mean that they seek the actual intent of individual voters. That
is what commentators think they mean, and that search is
fruitless for the reasons discussed. But there is an alternative.
They might mean that they seek the interpretation that voters,
as a group, would have selected had the question been put to
them. That seems consistent with their language, and that
search is not fruitless, at least as a matter of theory. Had voters been asked to vote over the alternative interpretations, they
112
would have settled on a particular one: the Condorcet winner.
That does not mean that all voters intended that interpretation
to control, but it does mean no majority would have preferred
an alternative interpretation.
113
Consider also the case of Skinner. There the California
Supreme Court made it easier to sustain an insanity defense by
114
rewriting an initiative so that it said “or” instead of “and.” If
the text generally provides the best evidence of voter intent
(presuming intent exists), then one might argue that the decision was wrongheaded. As Chief Justice Bird wrote in dissent,
intent should the interpreter reconstruct?”). Under my theory it does have a
clear objective: to identify the Condorcet winner. For a Condorcet winner to
exist, one must be able to situate the plausible interpretations on a single dimension—for example, narrower interpretations on one end, broader interpretations on the other—and voters must have single-peaked preferences over the
plausible interpretations. As discussed, voters may not always have singlepeaked preferences, but they probably have them some of the time, and they
may have them often.
110. See supra Part I.A.
111. See, e.g., Outfitter Props., L.L.C. v. Wildlife Conservation Bd., 143 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 312, 316 (Cal. App. 2012) (“In interpreting statutory language adopted by voter initiative, our primary task is to determine the intent of the electorate . . . .”).
112. I assume voters vote on pairwise combinations—for example, A versus
B, and then B versus C, and so forth—and discard proposals that lose.
113. People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d. 752 (Cal.1985).
114. Id. at 758.
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“[t]here is nothing . . . that implies that the electorate intended
‘and’ to be ‘or.’ . . . [I]t is not within this court’s power to ignore
115
the expression of popular will and rewrite the statute.” But if
I am right and judges seek Condorcet winners, then the decision may seem more palatable. The court concluded that “and”
116
could be a draftsman’s error, so the language was ambiguous.
We can understand the court to have then sought the interpretation the median voter would have preferred. That there was
no public outcry after Skinner, that prosecutors and defense
117
lawyers “lauded the court” for its decision, and that voters in
the twenty-seven years since have not bothered to overturn it
provides at least some evidence that the court’s guess about the
118
median voter’s preferences was about right. Skinner is just
an anecdote, of course, but it is suggestive.
Finally, consider judges’ incentives. Many state courts
judges, who are primarily responsible for ironing out ambiguities in initiatives, are subject to elections of one form or another. The median voter theorem predicts that in elections with
two candidates, the one closest to the middle of the political
119
spectrum—the median voter’s ideal point—will prevail. One
way judges can signal their proximity to the median voter is to
resolve ambiguities in ways consistent with the median voter’s
preferences.
Some judges do not compete against another candidate in
their elections but rather face retention elections. In such elections, the incumbent judge, and that judge alone, appears on
the ballot, and voters are asked whether they wish to retain
120
him or replace him. If a majority votes to replace, a new judge
121
is selected. Because there is only one candidate, the median
voter theorem does not directly apply to retention elections, but
115. Id. at 766 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 758.
117. Dan Morain, Court Rewrites Insanity Defense Rule: Prosecution, Defense Advocates Both Praise Return to Earlier Standard, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1985, at 3.
118. I am grateful to UVA’s excellent research librarian, Benjamin
Doherty, for help in examining the history and (as it turns out non-existent)
fallout of Skinner.
119. See COOTER, STRATEGIC, supra note 80, at 25–27 (“[T]he winning platform in certain conditions is the one favored by the citizen who is the median
in the statistical distribution of political sentiment.”).
120. E.g., Judicial Retention Elections, IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www
.iowacourts.gov/Public_Information/About_Judges/Retention/ (last visited Apr.
4, 2013).
121. Id.
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its logic is not irrelevant. A judge who interprets ambiguities
consistent with the preferences of the median voter probably
has a higher chance of being retained than a judge who fills
gaps in politically extreme ways.
Appointed judges also may have an incentive to cater to
the median. Although such judges are not directly accountable
to the public, the person who appoints them, typically the gov122
ernor, is. The logic of the median voter theorem usually will
compel gubernatorial candidates to align their positions with
those favored by the median voter. They can do so by, among
other things, selecting or promising to select judges who will interpret ambiguities consistent with the median’s preference.
That may give sitting judges who seek reappointment (or
would-be judges who seek an initial appointment) some incentive to attend to the median.
No judicial selection method is perfect. In the election set123
ting, voters often lack information about judicial candidates.
Judges, whether elected or appointed, sometimes may be better
off catering to narrow interest groups than to the median vot124
er. Some judges may ignore their reelection or reappointment
125
prospects when making official decisions. Consequently, in122. See, e.g., Judicial Appointments, OFF. OF GOVERNOR MARK DAYTON,
http://mn.gov/governor/appointments/judicial-appointments/ (last visited Apr.
4, 2013) (explaining that the Minnesota Commission on Judicial Selection recommends district court judge candidates to the governor for appointment).
123. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
43, 53–54, 59–72 (2003) (explaining that the vast majority of voters do not understand the candidates or issues, leading to high percentages of voter apathy
in judicial elections).
124. For evidence that state judges sometimes respond to narrow interests,
including political cronies and campaign contributors, rather than the median
voter, see, for example, Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 190, 215 & n.185 (1993) (“Successful [judicial] candidates would
have obligations to their supporters and grudges against their opponents.”);
Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J.
623, 649–50 (2008) (explaining that campaign contributions may directly influence judges to rule in favor of contributors or indirectly by increasing the
likelihood that judges who “share the interest groups’ preferences” stay in
power); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial
Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1063, 1064–65 (2010)
(“[S]tudies have shown that elected judges disproportionately rule in favor of
their campaign contributors.”).
125. Or they might pay close attention. See, e.g., Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for
Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 258 (2004) (finding evidence that some state
judges increase prison sentences as their reelections approach).
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terpreting initiatives consistent with the median voter’s preferences may not be critical to state judges’ careers. That does not
undermine my argument. I do not claim that judges always interpret initiatives to satisfy the median. I simply claim that
many judges have some incentive to attend to the median and
126
that sometimes they may act on that incentive.
To the extent career concerns make judges responsive to
the median voter, they presumably make them responsive to
127
today’s median voter. My claim is that we can understand
judges to seek the preferred interpretation of the enacting median voter. The two do not necessarily differ, or differ much.
Preferences on some issues may be stable, especially over short
periods, and the time between enactment and interpretation is
often short. But of course they can differ.
For that and other reasons, I do not claim, and I cannot
show, that courts are searching, definitively, for the interpretation the enacting median voter would have preferred. My claim
is that they are plausibly, perhaps unconsciously progressing
towards this.
If I am right, then this analysis helps clarify, for scholars
and perhaps for judges themselves, decades of judicial practice.
When judges interpret initiatives, we need not understand
them to be searching in vain for a clear and unified intent
among thousands of scattered and heterogeneous voters. Instead, we can understand them to be searching for the unique
interpretation that voters as a group would have selected had
they been given the chance. When seen through this lens, voter
128
intent is not an “illusory commodity” but a concrete and tractable concept.
This might give pause to scholars who have proposed new
approaches to the interpretation of initiatives. If the conventional approach—seeking voter intent—is not fatally flawed,
then perhaps new approaches are unwarranted. On the other
126. That incentive is not entirely accidental; judicial elections were designed in part to make judges more accountable to the public. See generally
Nelson, supra note 124, at 224 (“Since all officials tended to act out of selfinterest, the trick was to align their interests with those of the people.”);
Shugerman, supra note 124, at 1067–68 (explaining that supporters of judicial
elections wanted to check the legislative and executive branches and make the
judiciary more responsive to the defense of the peoples’ constitutional rights).
127. Judges may even respond to tomorrow’s median if they think they can
forecast where public sentiment will lie when their reelection or reappointment date arrives.
128. Smith, supra note 30, at 263–64.
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hand, the evidence for my theory might be unpersuasive, or
even if it is persuasive one might argue that searching for the
preference of the median voter is not desirable. Or perhaps it is
so difficult as to be pointless or, because it vests judges with
discretion, dangerous. The next Part addresses some of those
issues.
IV. THE CASE FOR THE CONDORCET WINNER
This Part addresses the normative question, how should
courts interpret initiatives? The answer I explore is simple, at
least as a matter of theory: give ambiguous initiatives the interpretation the median voter—by which I mean the median
among those who voted on the initiative—would have preferred. If my hypothesis in Part III is correct and we can understand judges to be doing this already, or struggling towards it,
then this is a justification of existing practice. If my hypothesis
is wrong, then it is an exploration of a new idea, albeit one consistent with the language courts already use to describe their
approach to the problem. It is also consonant with the purpose
of the institution, and therein lies the heart of the argument.
Direct democracy is a fundamentally majoritarian institution. Earlier in the paper I provided quotes from political fig129
ures to support that statement. Language from legal scholars
and judges supports it too. Professor Julian Eule, a prominent
scholar of direct democracy, wrote: “Majoritarian democracy
. . . is the core of our constitutional system. . . . [T]he plebiscite
certainly seems to have a strong claim to being its most treas130
ured instrument.” In 1919, the Supreme Court of Washington
stated that citizens adopted direct democracy “because they
had become impressed with a profound conviction that the Leg131
islature had ceased to be responsive to the popular will.” I
129. See supra Part I.B.
130. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503, 1513 (1990); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s
Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1978) (“[Reviewing initiatives] involve[s] the difficult task of balancing the statutory rights of minorities against the majority’s desire to implement its will.”); Eule, supra, at 1514
(criticizing direct democracy and stating: “The gap between the will of the majority and the voice of the legislature, it turns out, is there by constitutional
design.”). To be clear, and notwithstanding the quote in the text, Eule did not
believe the federal Constitution itself is especially majoritarian in character.
See id. at 1522–30 (explaining how the Constitution “filters” and limits majority will).
131. State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 181 P. 920, 922 (Wash. 1919).
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could provide many more quotes from many more sources.
Stating that direct democracy is designed to be majoritarian is
not controversial.
The rest of the argument follows from that premise. If direct democracy aims to empower the majority, then one might
reason that courts should interpret the products of direct democracy in majoritarian-empowering ways. To do otherwise
would undercut the institution. Judges are supposed to review
initiatives for constitutionality, and perhaps review them with
133
special care, but few would argue that they should undercut
134
the institution that produces them. Doing so could put pressure on judges who stand between democratic majorities and
the interpretations those voters preferred. It could also prevent
voters from reaping all of the benefits—and observing and paying all of the costs—of direct democracy.
That second argument merits closer attention. As discussed, scholars have suggested new methods for interpreting
135
initiatives. Some of their suggestions are motivated by a desire to mitigate common (or at least commonly perceived) prob136
lems with direct democracy. Even if their proposals would
mitigate those problems, they may come at a cost: they may
make it harder to assess the institution. Observers may not
know whether to attribute the successes and failures of initiatives to the initiative process itself or to the process in combination with judges using specialized interpretive techniques.
Without a clear picture of the process, it may be difficult to understand and reform it. Separating the question of interpretation from normative judgments about the process would yield
132. See, e.g., Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 1993), aff’d by
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (noting that an initiative deserved “great
deference” from courts because its support “by a majority of voters” constituted
“an expression of popular will”); MILLER, supra note 26, at 90 (stating that
Justice Black once told then-Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall that his
challenge to an initiative had less force because initiatives “let[] the people of
the State—the voters of the State—establish their policy, which is as near to a
democracy as you can get”).
133. See Eule, supra note 130, at 1558 (calling for a “hard judicial look” for
initiatives).
134. Frickey may be understood to have taken that position. He argued for
narrow construction of initiatives on the ground that they are “in derogation of
republican government.” See Frickey, supra note 55, at 522. But I do not think
he understood himself to take that position. He argued that none of his proposals “seem[] insufficiently respectful of direct democracy because, under
each of them, the core purposes of the electorate are protected.” Id. at 523.
135. See supra Part I.A.
136. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
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the opposite virtue and vice. It may not mitigate problems with
the process, but it may make those problems plain. That approach may facilitate accurate assessments and reforms, and
that outcome may be better for those concerned about direct
democracy’s problems than the alternative.
If judges want to interpret initiatives in majoritarian ways,
then a natural approach would be to search among plausible
interpretations for the one that the median voter among those
who voted on the initiative would have preferred. To select a
different interpretation would undermine majority will by producing a result that a majority of those who voted on the original initiative would, if they could, immediately vote to change.
I can strengthen this line of reasoning with an analogy.
Suppose that two initiatives appear on the ballot at the same
time. Like the initiative in Skinner, suppose that both address
the insanity defense, but one says “and” (hard to sustain an insanity defense) and the other says “or” (easier to sustain an insanity defense). As sometimes happens, suppose a majority pre137
fers both proposals to the status quo, and both pass. Because
of the conflict in language, both cannot take effect. In this situation, courts in many states follow the highest vote rule, which
directs them to give force to the initiative that received the
greatest number of affirmative votes and to invalidate the com138
peting measure. The logic is simple: as the Supreme Court of
Colorado wrote, “the recipient of the greatest popular support[]
will be given effect” because it expresses “the predominant will
139
of the people.” Put differently, courts should choose the initiative that “the people” prefer, which is the one that received
140
more votes.
Now suppose that instead of two initiatives, there is only
one on the ballot. It passes, and it has a genuinely ambiguous
provision. There are good reasons to believe “and” means “and,”
137. See Michael D. Gilbert & Joshua M. Levine, Less Can Be More: Conflicting Ballot Proposals and the Highest Vote Rule, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 383
(2009) (discussing and providing examples of conflicting initiatives that pass
simultaneously).
138. Id. at 387–89.
139. In re Interrogatories Propounded by the Senate Concerning House Bill
1078, 536 P.2d 308, 314 (Colo. 1975).
140. See id. The highest vote rule does not always achieve its intended result. See Gilbert & Levine, supra note 137, at 389 (“Contrary to intuition, the
highest vote rule can thwart majority will by enacting voters’ second-choice
proposal (or worse) instead of their first.”). For a model explaining why that is
so, see id. at 389–93.
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and there are good reasons to believe “and” means “or.” Which
interpretation should courts choose? The analogy to the prior
scenario with two initiatives seems strong. If one agrees that
courts in that prior scenario are right to seek among the competing initiatives the one that a majority prefers, then perhaps
courts should do the same here.
This discussion leads to an important point: if courts want
majoritarian interpretations, they should focus on the median
among all voters, including those who opposed the initiative in
question. That may seem counterintuitive, but in fact it is essential, because doing otherwise would thwart majority will.
The following example shows why.
In 2004, voters in Michigan approved Proposal 2, a consti141
tutional initiative prohibiting same-sex marriage. The key
language of the proposal reads: “[T]he union of one man and
one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized
142
as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.” The last
phrase, “for any purpose,” was the subject of a recent decision
143
of the Supreme Court of Michigan. The question the court
faced was whether that phrase prohibits public employers from
providing health insurance benefits to employees’ same-sex
144
domestic partners.
Suppose that Michigan had only five voters, and suppose
one could arrange them from left to right, where Voter 1 had
the most liberal views of same-sex relationships and Voter 5
had the most conservative views. Suppose that Voters 3, 4, and
5 voted in favor of Proposal 2, giving it the majority it needed to
become law. Suppose that Voter 3 understood the disputed language to ban same-sex marriage but not to prohibit the health
insurance benefits. Voter 4 understood the language to ban
same-sex marriage and also to prohibit the benefits. If a court
interpreting the language focused on the median voter among
only those who approved the law, it would select the interpretation favored by Voter 4. But that would be anti-majoritarian. A
majority, Voters 1, 2, and 3, would prefer Voter 3’s interpreta-

141. For a discussion of Proposal 2 and the problems initiatives like it
raise, see generally Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17 (2006).
142. See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
143. See Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524,
532 (Mich. 2008).
144. Id. at 529.
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tion. Voter 3 is the median among all voters, and her preferred
interpretation is the Condorcet winner.
This leads to an important point: courts should be wary of
the interpretation favored by an initiative’s drafters, even if
those drafters understand the initiative best. Drafters, one
might suppose, typically have strong feelings on the subject of
the initiative and relatively extreme views. Otherwise they
would not incur the costs necessary to place an initiative on the
ballot. Their views may differ substantially from the median
voter’s. After Proposal 2 passed in Michigan, one of its authors
argued that the initiative’s broad language not only prohibited
same-sex marriage, it prohibited benefits for same-sex part145
ners. That might have reflected the author’s sincere understanding of the initiative from the outset. But as the five-voter
illustration makes clear, that understanding, if adopted by
courts, could be anti-majoritarian.
This discussion gives rise to an important limiting principle. When I suggest that courts give ambiguous initiatives the
interpretation the median voter would prefer, I mean the interpretation the median voter would prefer among plausible interpretations. I do not suggest that courts, upon encountering any
ambiguity, should seek to replace it with the median voter’s
ideal interpretation. Ambiguities are ubiquitous; different
judges can in good faith find ambiguities in many circumstances. Replacing all ambiguities with the median voter’s ideal
point would be radical. Nearly every initiative garnering majority support, no matter its text and purpose, could be transformed by judicial interpretation into the policy most favored
by the median. That could eviscerate the meaning of, and the
146
ability of actors to rely on, legal language.
My position is more modest. I suggest that courts, upon encountering an ambiguity, should identify all plausible interpretations of the language in question. That universe will depend
on the exact arguments made by the parties, the text of the initiative, the ballot pamphlets and other extrinsic aids judges
consult, and judges’ varying philosophies. I make one observation in that regard: if a majority of those who voted on the ini145. See Staszewski, supra note 141, at 19.
146. Notwithstanding the decision in Skinner, which rewrote the initiative
in question but provoked little public response, I believe, and I think most others do too, that some actors rely in important ways on legal language some of
the time. See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text. Interpreting initiatives without the limiting principle I discuss would undermine their ability to
do that.
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tiative would have preferred the status quo that prevailed beforehand to a particular interpretation, then that interpretation is not plausible. Once courts have winnowed the field to
plausible interpretations, and regardless of how they have done
so, then I suggest that they should search among those interpretations for the one the median voter would have preferred.
That leads to the practical question: how are courts supposed to identify the median’s preferred interpretation? My
principal goal is to uncover a coherent objective for courts interpreting initiatives, not to chart a precise course for achieving
it, but I do have one comment and one suggestion. The comment is that identifying a coherent objective could lead to helpful innovations by lawyers and litigants. Providing a target
could lead to new approaches and arguments that help judges
to strike that target. The suggestion pertains to evidence.
Courts could augment their analysis by permitting litigants to
introduce, and by taking seriously, opinion polls. Returning to
Michigan’s Proposal 2, a poll conducted shortly before the election showed that while half of respondents favored a ban on gay
marriage, over sixty percent of them opposed denying benefits
147
to public employees’ same-sex partners. That suggests that
an interpretation of Proposal 2 that only banned gay marriage
and left benefits intact would have aligned more closely with
148
the median voter’s preference.
Opinion polls have weaknesses. In the Michigan example,
149
the poll was taken close to the time of the vote, but others
may not be, raising questions about whether they capture the
views of the enacting median voter. More generally, polls may
raise more questions than answers, and that in turn may give
150
judges discretion subject to abuse. If on average polls do more
147. See Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc., 748 N.W.2d at 547–48 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (discussing those polls).
148. See id. Many interpreters focused on voter intent in the conventional
(and many scholars would argue fanciful) sense may have reached the same
proposed result: gay marriage is banned but employee benefits remain. See,
e.g., id. at 552. That buttresses my descriptive claim in Part III insofar as it
suggests that decisions rooted in voter intent can be understood, and understood with greater precision, as decisions aimed at majority will. The Supreme
Court of Michigan did not adopt the proposed interpretation. See id. at 543
(majority opinion) (holding that Proposal 2 forbids the provision of benefits to
same-sex domestic partners).
149. See id. at 547 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (noting that Michigan poll was
taken in August 2004).
150. Cf. Schacter, supra note 27, at 144–45 (arguing that permitting judges
to consider extrinsic sources, such as media, when interpreting initiatives
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harm than good, then perhaps judges should never use them,
even if they could help in some cases. Because of those complications I do not argue that courts should give decisive weight to
polls. I just suggest that if courts seek the interpretation preferred by the enacting median, polls may sometimes help.
Polls may have another virtue. Recall that those who vote
on initiatives are not necessarily representative of all voters, let
151
alone society at large. They may lack complete information
152
about initiatives, and they may be confused or even deceived.
153
Many observers criticize direct democracy on those grounds.
Using opinion polls to resolve ambiguities in initiatives could
mitigate those problems. Poll respondents may be more representative of society than the subset of voters who voted on the
initiative, and pollsters could—I repeat, could—frame issues
more clearly than initiative sponsors.
Those ideas raise interesting and hard questions, such as
whether citizens who did not vote on an initiative should have
any influence in determining its meaning. I take no position on
that. I only note that polls could be used for multiple ends.
I conclude with an observation and a qualification. The observation is about judges. Earlier I noted that state judges, because of their accountability, may have an incentive to interpret initiatives consistent with the preference of today’s median
voter. Ordinarily we would condemn judicial decisions that re154
sult from political calculations, but when it comes to the interpretation of initiatives that reaction may be unjustified. This
Article suggests that majoritarian interpretations are not only
consistent with the language courts have long used to describe
their inquiries, they also further the purpose of initiatives. In
those respects at least, majoritarian interpretations can be understood to be legalistic, especially when today’s median resembles the enacting median. So political pressures, and judg-

could make the search for voter intent even less determinate).
151. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., CRONIN, supra note 75, at 196–222 (criticizing direct democracy on various grounds).
154. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 696–97 (1995) (“[T]o the
extent majoritarian pressures influence judicial decisions because of judges’
electoral calculations, elective judiciaries seem, at least at first glance, irreconcilable with one of the fundamental principles underlying constitutionalism.”).
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es’ submissions to them, are not necessarily antithetical to law.
We can understand them to promote law.
As for the qualification, I am not the first to propose that
courts consider the median voter when contemplating the
meaning of legal language. Many scholars have argued that
courts interpreting statutes do—or should—consider the preferences of the median legislator or of median committee mem155
bers. However, I am, to my knowledge, the first to make this
argument in the context of initiatives, and in that context the
argument has special force. Legislators passing statutes epitomize bargain democracy, and in bargain democracy there is no
special reason to focus on the median. Political bargaining
leads to statutes, or individual provisions of statutes, that favor
one interest or another; you get your environmental protections, and I get my farm subsidies. When faced with ambiguities in such provisions, courts may focus, as a default, on the
preferences of the median legislator, but we cannot say that
such a focus furthers the purpose of the institution or produces
Condorcet winners. In direct democracy, on the other hand, we
can make exactly these arguments.
V. AN INTERPRETATION/REVIEW PARADOX?

156

In addition to interpretation, legal scholars have focused
157
on another aspect of direct democracy: judicial review. How,
they ask, should courts review the constitutionality of initiatives? One school of thought, championed by Professors Julian
Eule and Derrick Bell, holds that because of their majoritarian
character initiatives are especially likely to infringe on the
158
rights of protected minorities. Many observers outside of the
159
legal academy have expressed that same concern. Eule and
155. See, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 24, at 721–25.
156. The tradeoff identified in Part V is an instantiation of a general thesis
I have developed in separate work. See Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial Independence and Social Welfare, 112 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1885104.
157. Of course, the two issues are linked. To determine whether an initiative complies with the Constitution, judges must first determine what the initiative means. For discussion of this relationship, see generally Frickey, supra
note 55.
158. See Eule, supra note 130, at 1548–58; see generally Bell, supra note
130 (discussing instances of minority rights infringement through direct democracy).
159. See, e.g., Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote,
41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 245 (1997) (“One question persistently haunts the use
of direct democracy: when citizens have the power to legislate issues directly,
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Bell would mitigate it by having courts review initiatives with
160
heightened scrutiny.
Eule and Bell have their critics, but for present purposes
suppose they are right that initiatives deserve heightened scrutiny. Or suppose that initiatives deserve only equivalent scrutiny, that is, the same level of scrutiny that laws passed through
161
ordinary legislative channels receive. That position is less
controversial. Either case may give rise to a paradox.
Judges who are accountable to voters, as many state judges
are, may hesitate to give initiatives the scrutiny they deserve.
As Eule wrote, “[J]udicial protection is most needed in the face
of voter measures motivated by popular passion or prejudice.
Yet it is precisely when electorally accountable judges stand up
162
to such efforts that they are most at risk.” That concern is not
entirely hypothetical. Otto Klaus, a former member of California’s Supreme Court, once stated that ignoring the political
consequences of judicial decisions is “like ignoring a crocodile in
163
your bathtub.” He admitted that his vote to uphold the constitutionality of a particular initiative may have been influ164
enced by his upcoming retention election. More generally,
empirical studies suggest that politics plays a role when judges
165
review initiatives.

will the majority tyrannize the minority?”).
160. See Bell, supra note 130, at 22–28; Eule, supra note 130, at 1548–73;
see also Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus: Judicial Review of Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 237, 239 (1999) (calling for
strict scrutiny for all initiatives).
161. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting: Differential Standards of Judicial Review of Direct Legislation, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 373, 375–76 (1996)
(arguing against differential standards of review for initiatives).
162. Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 733, 739 (1994)
(footnote omitted); see also Frickey, supra note 55, at 508 (“When the same entity both enacts the law and periodically elects the judges, however, judges are
not only subject to after-the-fact discipline or replacement for their interpretations, but also are likely to be unusually deferential in the first place.”).
163. Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 52,
58.
164. See Philip Hager, Kaus Urges Reelection of Embattled Court Justices,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1986, at 3.
165. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 103, at 346–50 (finding some evidence
that judges’ political views correlate with their decisions to uphold or invalidate initiatives when reviewing them for compliance with the single subject
rule); John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive Enforcement of the
Single Subject Rule, 9 ELECTION L.J. 399, 401 (2010) (finding the same result,
albeit without variables that control for law).
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Given those concerns, some scholars and institutional de166
signers might like to make state judges more independent.
Such judges are often responsible for reviewing initiatives for
compliance with both state and federal constitutions, and
greater independence may be the best way to ensure that initi167
atives get the proper level of scrutiny. But that change might
have a paradoxical effect. The same independence that empowers judges to review initiatives might, by breaking the electoral
connection, reduce their incentive to resolve ambiguities in initiatives consistent with the median voter’s preference. What we
gain in proper review we might lose, or more than lose, in interpretation.
The flipside, of course, is that the relatively dependent
state judges we have, even if they fail to deliver searching review, might compensate for that shortcoming. The same dependence that hinders their constitutional review might facilitate desirable interpretations.
In short, I believe that we face an important and underappreciated choice. We can design a judiciary that gets interpretation right or that gets constitutional review right, but we
probably cannot design a judiciary that gets both right.
CONCLUSION
This paper has offered a new view of judicial interpretation
of initiatives. It has shown that judges plausibly do—and arguably should—attempt to interpret initiatives consistent with
the preferences of the enacting median voter. Developing those
ideas led to a variety of insights that deserve attention in their
own right, perhaps more attention than I have given them
here. But much of the virtue of the work may lie elsewhere. The
main contribution may simply be clarity and concreteness.
There is no such thing as voter intent, conventionally understood, but there is such a thing as a median voter. That voter’s
preferred interpretation has an especially strong claim to being
the majoritarian interpretation. That set of ideas presents
judges, for the first time, with an explicit and defensible target
in these cases.

166. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 55, at 508.
167. Cf. id. (noting that elected judges are “politically situated far differently” than federal judges when reviewing controversial ballot measures).

